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AbstrAct Multiple social science 
disciplines have converged on the senses in 
recent years, where formerly the domain of 
perception was the preserve of psychology. 
Linguistics, or Language, however, 
seems to have an ambivalent role in this 
undertaking. On the one hand, Language 
with a capital L (language as a general 
human capacity) is part of the problem. It 
was the prior focus on language (text) that 
led to the disregard of the senses. On the 
other hand, it is language (with a small “l,” 
a particular tongue) that offers key insights 
into how other peoples conceptualize the 
senses. In this article, we argue that a 
systematic cross-cultural approach can 
reveal fundamental truths about the precise 
connections between language and the 
senses. recurring failures to adequately 
describe the sensorium across specific 
languages reveal the intrinsic limits of 
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Language. but the converse does not hold. Failures 
of expressibility in one language need not hold 
any implications for the Language faculty per se, 
and indeed can enlighten us about the possible 
experiential worlds available to human experience.
KEYWORDS: language of perception, ineffability, qualia, codability, 
the senses
The Role of Language in the “New Sensibility”
There has been a recent move, celebrated in these pages, 
to “sensualize” anthropology and the other social science 
disciplines (e.g. history, geography, linguistics) that study 
the differing nature of human experience across cultures and 
environments (see e.g. Classen 1997; Evans and Wilkins 2000; Feld 
1990; Howes 1991, 2004). The disembodied nature of contemporary 
inquiry into human relations with the environment came to a head in 
the postmodernist treatment of ethnography, which wrote off the 
senses, by privileging textualization at the expense of perception and 
participant observation:
Perception has nothing to do with [ethnography]. An ethno­
graphy is no account of a rationalized movement from percept 
to concept. It begins and ends in concepts. There is no origin in 
perception, no priority to vision, and no data of observation . . . 
[An ethnography] is not a record of experience at all; it is the 
means of experience. That experience became experience 
only in the writing of the ethnography. Before that it was only 
a disconnected array of chance happenings. (Tyler 1986: 137)
Since then, there has been a healthy corrective, for example in the 
interest in “soundscapes” in ethnomusicology and anthropology 
(see e.g. Keil et al. 2002) and in the “social sciences of the senses” 
movement that spawned this journal. Meanwhile, in psychology, 
the “embodiment” movement has united a number of different lines 
of inquiry (e.g. the direct activation of motor cortex by perception 
of gesture or words, the understanding of one sensory domain 
by mapping on another, the association of emotion with sensory 
experience) that place the human body as an integrated sensorium 
at center stage.
Now, language seems to have a rather ambivalent role in this 
enterprise. On the one hand, Language with a capital L (language as 
a general human capacity) is part of the problem: it was obsession 
with language that got us into the over­concentration on text in the 
first place, ending up with “writing culture” writing off the senses. 
Moreover it was the apparent limits of Language that partly motivated 
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Braille) only in acoustic or visual form, and it seems ill adapted to 
describing many of the senses that haunt our memories or excite our 
bodies, like taste and smell, touch and proprioception. It often seems 
that Language by virtue of its special relationship to consciousness 
is hooked primarily into the “higher senses” – psychologists have 
predicted for example that Language has access only to the distal 
senses (sight and hearing; see e.g. Schachtel 1959). For these 
reasons, the analysis of language may seem to lead precisely away 
from a proper appreciation of the senses.
But, on the other hand, it is of course language (with a small 
“l,” a particular tongue) that offers us key insights into how other 
peoples conceptualize the senses (as when a language talks about 
“hearing” what one feels with the fingers, or offers multiple primary 
verbs of smelling with nothing equivalent for other senses). Following 
these leads can yield rich insights into the differential importance of 
specific senses across cultures. Further, the crossmodal mappings 
that have played an important role in “embodiment” approaches are 
typically expressed in metaphor or other verbal conflations. These 
particularities of specific languages – for example, whether the pitch 
of sounds are distinguished on a high–low dimension as in English, 
or on a thick–thin dimension as in Turkish or Farsi (see Shayan et al., 
this issue) – these conflations in vocabulary can be shown to play an 
important role in our thinking (Casasanto et al. 2003). Languages are 
windows on the senses that we can hardly afford to ignore.
Here we argue that language in fact offers us relevant insight 
in just these two crucial ways. On the one hand we can chart the 
failures of Language to adequately describe the sensorium, and in 
so doing explore the intrinsic limits of language. As the literature on 
qualia reminds us, no amount of language makes up for the sense 
itself: imagine trying to teach a congenitally blind child the meaning 
of “red.” For both the objective and subjective world, language is a 
coarse map, but whereas the description of a pyramid can convey 
the nature of the thing, for subjective “raw feels” like color sensations 
language fails to delineate – I can teach you “red” only by pointing to 
it. The language of qualia is a realm where ostension plays a crucial 
role in learning the meaning, even if the corresponding qualia are 
subjective and ineffable (what you see and I see when we look at the 
same color chip may be different, but we can learn to associate them 
with “red”; cf. Wittgenstein 1953). If this is so, then the availability of 
repeated ostension is crucial for learning the labels of quale. That 
suggests, for example, that it might be quite difficult to learn detailed 
labels for smells, since the odor compounds will diffuse, and are 
unlikely to be the same from sniff to sniff, let alone day to day or 
place to place.
But caution is in order. It is easy to confuse the deficiencies of 
our specific language with the intrinsic limitations of Language. Just 
because English is poor for the description of smells, it does not 
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power of language. This is where the second line of linguistic insight 
comes into play: in another language and another place odors can 
be richly coded, showing that what seems like an inherent limitation 
of Language is a mere limitation of our language, and the culture 
that supports it. English, it turns out, is already richer than the Greek 
of the New Testament: translators have worried for 500 years over 
how to translate 2 Corinthians II:16, for example as “to the one a 
stench from death to death; to the other a sweet aroma from life to 
life” (World English Bible), even though the Greek uses just one word 
osme¯, rendered here as stench and aroma. But other languages 
have over a dozen primary smell terms, making exquisitely fine 
distinctions (see the description of Jahai speakers, as described by 
Burenhult and Majid, this issue). Having a lot of smell terms might 
make a vital difference. For example, in a recent court case a man 
lived with the rotting corpse of his friend Denis Pring for years, despite 
the complaints of his neighbors in the municipal apartment block in 
Bristol: the council inspector walked right past the body under the 
sofa, and put the “stink” down to an overflowing toilet.1 Putrescent 
flesh emits distinctive gases, e.g. cadaverine and putrescine, rather 
different than the methane of the latrine, but reporting them under 
a general label stink may literally dull our senses – impossible in a 
language like Samoan that makes precisely this distinction (Viberg 
1983). Languages curtail or elaborate their treatment of each of the 
senses, and in so doing hint at the cultural landscape of the senses. 
We can then exploit linguistic variation as a source of insight into the 
cultural construction of the sensorium. That is what this special issue 
is all about.
Does it matter whether a percept is directly coded in language? 
Much theory and data suggests it does. Take color: when we view 
colors in normal binocular vision, the categories of our language 
warp color space, so that colors across lexical categories seem more 
distant than they really are. If we experimentally restrict the display 
so that only the left visual field is available, thus projecting to the 
right (language­less) hemisphere, the effect disappears (Gilbert et al. 
2006). Color categories vary across languages, so that for example 
a speaker of Russian endowed with light blue (goluboy) and dark 
blue (siniy) categories will warp the color space in slightly different 
ways to a speaker of English. Consequently Russian speakers are 
comparatively faster to discriminate blue shades that lie across the 
boundary (Winawer et al. 2007), but if you occupy their language 
capacity with another concurrent task, the effect disappears. Or 
consider odor. Subjects exposed to a manufactured odor and told 
that it was “cheddar cheese” showed activation of a specific area 
of the brain that processes olfactory information; now told that it 
was “body odor” other areas were activated; and when presented 
with clean air and told it was “cheddar cheese,” again the same 
“cheese area” was activated, although to a lesser extent (de Araujo 
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right down to primary perception. In sum, the way a language cuts 
up the sensorium can be shown to have significant effects directly 
on percepts. For this reason language is a crucial interface between 
individual psychology and the cultural construction of the world 
around us. Language regiments our communication, and in so doing 
regiments our thinking.
For those whose main interests are in aesthetics, consider William 
James’ theory of consciousness and its echoes in Marcel Proust. 
Consciousness seems to be constituted by resting places, tied by 
fleeting associations:
The resting­places are usually occupied by sensorial imag­
inations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be 
held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contem­
plated without changing; the places of flight are filled with 
thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part 
obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of 
comparative rest. (James 1890: 236)
It is the fleeting relations, the involuntary memories stirred by the 
associations, that constitute for Proust the heart of the aesthetic 
experience:
The taste of our breakfast coffee brings with it that vague hope 
of fine weather which so often long ago, as with the day still 
intact and full before us, we were drinking it out of a bowl of 
white porcelain, creamy and fluted and itself looking almost like 
vitrified milk, suddenly smiled upon us in the pale uncertainty of 
the dawn. (Proust 1981: 924)
If language codifies the resting points of consciousness, recognizing 
for example light blue vs. dark blue or specific kinds of smells, while 
sending the aesthetic associations into the secondary relations, then 
language plays a crucial role in constructing the very landscape of 
consciousness (Epstein 2004).
Language, then, plays a fundamental intermediary role between 
the subjective, individual nature of sensation and the cultural world 
that constructs the perceptual field. The cultural world provides the 
sensory environment – the smells, the tastes, the colors, the shapes, 
the spaces, the sounds that we perceive. Biology provides the 
individual’s sense organs and the cortical processing of sensations 
that process the sensory information. But without language our 
sharing of perceptual experience would be confined to shared 
environments and shared biology: a mechanical sharing without 
intersubjectivity. What language adds is the projection outwards 
from the individual psyche of private sensations now clothed in 
public representations, and conversely, the introjection of public 
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already noted in the color and odor domains. Language gives us 
intersubjective sensory experience, without which there could not be 
a social science of the senses.
The Articles in This Special Issue
The articles that make up this special issue share a common basis. All 
the authors are participants in a large cross­cultural, cross­linguistic 
study of the Language of Perception (LoP) hosted at the Max Planck 
Institute for Psycholinguistics. To try and bring some precision into 
this enterprise, we equipped them each with the identical kit of 
systematic stimuli. The stimuli covered the traditional five senses, 
with sets exploring visual properties (Munsell color chips, distinct 
geometric shapes), auditory properties (pitch, amplitude, rhythm), 
olfactory properties (a set of commercially available scratch­and­
sniff cards), gustatory properties (stimuli corresponding to the basic 
taste receptors), and tactile properties (a set of surfaces, to be 
explored haptically while blindfolded) (Majid 2007).2 The application 
of these materials in over twenty languages has yielded a mountain 
of interesting data, which we are still in the process of sifting.
The application of standardized stimuli has some obvious 
advantages: we have controlled perceptual events across individuals, 
so that we can interpret individuals’ corresponding linguistic responses; 
we can replicate those events in myriad settings, facilitating cross­
cultural comparison and we can target specific ranges of perceptual 
experience that we may never happenchance upon as bystanders. 
But to fully understand the results of these controlled elicitations, 
we need much more: namely, a comprehensive understanding of 
the linguistic system and a rich grounding in ethnography. This kind 
of depth of cultural understanding across multiple communities 
cannot be achieved by a single researcher but requires concerted 
collaboration. The combination of field experiment and naturalistic 
observation across multiple settings allows us to establish what is 
universally accessible to Language and what is language­specific. 
This special issue presents first results of such an endeavor.
Here we have asked a dozen of the researchers in the LoP project 
to report on some of the highlights of their investigations. Many of 
these reports concern languages of small­scale speech communities, 
which may have a special interest as giving some indication of the 
sensual worlds we too inhabited before the industrial age, but which 
we have now lost. There is another reason for interest in small­
scale speech communities: the languages of complex societies 
with evolved divisions of labor are internally refracted, offering 
the specialist registers of perfumers, wine tasters, and gourmets. 
Although interesting enough, these specialist vocabularies play little 
role in our general cultural life. It could be argued that one of the 
advantages of examining small­scale, face­to­face cultures, with 
minimalist divisions of labor and without literary traditions is that 
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general population: the presence of a word expressing a distinctive 
sensation presupposes the corresponding mental category. As the 
articles in this special issue demonstrate, a cross­cultural perspective 
demonstrates myriad categories unknown to Western social science.
Variation and Stability of Perceptual Categories
Burenhult and Majid describe the exquisite elaboration of olfactory 
categories amongst Jahai speakers, a group of hunter­gatherers 
roaming the Malay Peninsula. Olfaction, they argue, also plays a 
critical role in the religious belief system of the Jahai. But the ap­
pearance of these olfactory terms is not limited to religious contexts 
– they appear in everyday discourse across multiple genres. Looking 
beyond the Jahai, it turns out that olfactory categories show 
remarkable stability, transcending major present­day cultural and 
environmental boundaries. Abstract olfactory terms appear in many 
parts of Southeast Asia: “from the Jahai foragers in the Malayan 
rainforests to Kammu swiddeners in Laotian uplands to Khmer 
nation­builders in Mekong floodplains” (Burenhult and Majid, this 
issue). The languages of all these groups belong to the Austroasiatic 
family, suggesting that these categories have a deep time­depth 
(a view reinforced by historical reconstruction of vocabularies), 
demonstrating a long­standing preoccupation with odor in this 
language family and this part of the world. This is an intriguing 
finding, since much contemporary cognitive­ and neuroscience 
presupposes that olfaction is merely vestigial in humans, and so 
could not provide a robust sensory palette on which to build a 
detailed and stable vocabulary.
In the domain of taste and flavor, we also see elaborate categories 
in this same geographical area. Enfield presents a case study of two 
languages in contact – Lao and Kri – that appear to have converged 
on their categories for taste. Alongside the elaboration of the semantic 
categories in the culinary domain, there is evidence that speakers of 
these two languages may also have superior discrimination abilities 
for taste sensations. In contrast to olfactory categories, however, 
these parallel systems are not likely to be from a common inherited 
set of distinctions of a parent language, since the two languages 
under consideration are not related. Instead, Enfield argues that the 
convergence has been brought about by long­term social interaction 
between members of these language groups.
Of course language communities have always been in contact, 
but globalization has meant language contact of a very different kind. 
Senft and de Sousa both consider the results of Western contact 
on indigenous perceptual categories, contrasting what happens 
to domains valued by the West (such as color) to those that are 
relatively neglected in Western culture (such as taste). de Sousa finds 
dramatic changes in the language of perception in Cantonese within 
just two generations. In essence, the distal experiences of color 
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smell and taste have deteriorated. Many of these changes can be 
linked directly to the implementation of Western­style schooling that 
the younger generation undergoes. Within this education system 
knowledge gained through the visual modality is valued, trained, and 
honed, at the expense of traditional categories. But there may also 
be environmental contingencies that change the types of perceptual 
experiences people enjoy. de Sousa argues that the changing 
olfactory environment – a result of changes in sanitation and notions 
of cleanliness – has meant a new generation is simply not exposed 
to the same kinds of olfactory experiences of previous generations.
Senft, on the other hand, finds remarkably few changes in a 
period of nearly twenty­five years in which he has conducted field 
work on the Trobriand Islands in Papua New Guinea. The indigenous 
color terms are still strongly evident in use, especially in the context 
of traditional material culture (canoes, chiefly yam houses, domestic 
houses, body painting), but the terms are now supplemented by 
English borrowings, since the younger generation is being taught 
English color words in school. Taste terms likewise show remarkable 
consistency over this long period of time, with little evident borrowing. 
In both the Kilivila and Cantonese cases we see a new proliferation 
of categories for the visual domain but the two communities differ in 
how the proximal senses have fared under contact with the West. 
While Cantonese speakers show a loss of traditional categories 
in the taste domain, Kilivila speakers show no such decline. As 
Senft describes, this is probably because the Kilivila have never 
shown much preoccupation or elaboration of culinary activities. 
Thus the minimally differentiated lexical system of Kilivila survives; the 
elaborated distinctions of Cantonese taste are slowly eroded.
Limits of Expressibility
How do speakers cope when their language does not have a fully 
developed system for expressing a perceptual category? In the 
articles by Hill, Senft, and de Vos, the languages under consideration 
lack an exhaustive color­naming system. Umpila (spoken in Cape 
York Peninsula, Australia), Kilivila (in the Trobriand Islands of Papua 
New Guinea), and Kata Kolok (a village sign language, in Northern 
Bali) all have abstract descriptive color terms but these terms do 
not exhaustively partition the color space, counter to what has been 
claimed in earlier work (Berlin and Kay 1969; although see Kay 
and Maffi 1999; Levinson 2000). Umpila and Kilivila both have an 
indigenous three­term color system (black–white–red),3 while Kata 
Kolok has a four­term one, (black–white–red–“grue,” i.e. green­blue). 
These color terms have restricted ranges over the color spectrum so 
speakers have to resort to other devices in order to put into language 
a particular color experience.
Some recurring strategies for dealing with these gaps emerge 
in all three languages, irrespective of speech modality (signed or 
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a banana, leaf, or flower. In Kata Kolok these descriptions are iconic­
indexical (speakers point or otherwise indicate the objects that are 
exemplars of the color they intend to convey). This iconicity is also 
clearly evident in three of the four lexicalized color terms – black: 
indicating hair, white: indicating teeth, red: indicating lips. The most 
abstract term – contrary to the Berlin–Kay evolutionary sequence 
of color term elaboration – is the grue term, which possibly derives 
from the act of putting colored rice on the forehead at traditional 
Hindu ceremonies. But these lexicalized signs (as opposed to the 
ad­hoc source descriptors) are integrated into the linguistic system 
such that they can take morphological marking. The fascinating 
thing about the Kata Kolok system is its restricted color­naming 
system, despite a significant cultural preoccupation with color in both 
religious and everyday contexts, and a correspondingly elaborate 
color terminology in the surrounding spoken Balinese.
This contrasts with the Umpila situation: color appears not to 
be a culturally significant organizing factor and so the limited color 
terminology evidenced in the language is unsurprising. But to 
appreciate how speakers deal with the gaps in their color­naming 
system, an understanding of the cultural interest and preoccupation 
of the Umpila is required. Hill beautifully illustrates the rich and 
intricate systems of knowledge, which are so delicately interwoven 
that a single part is not fully grasped without glimpsing the whole. 
Gaps in the color­naming system are linguistically expressed by 
drawing on the kinship system, which is in turn critically related 
to the environment – an area of cultural and linguistic salience for 
the Umpila. Further exploration of these domains shows linguistic 
attunement to luminance and reflectance, rather than brightness 
and hue, the classical foci in color research.4 Umpila speakers are 
attuned to an altogether different aspect of their visual environment. 
By trying to understand the gaps in the lexical system in one place 
(hue), Hill is able to reveal the Umpila sensitivity to other aspects of 
the visual world.
Lack of expressibility of perceptual fields is not limited to the 
visual realm. Shayan, Ozturk, and Sicoli describe how speakers of 
three unrelated languages – Turkish, Farsi, and Zapotec – express 
experiences of simple sounds. Their point of departure is auditory 
signals that vary in pitch, loudness, and tempo. It turns out that there 
is little dedicated vocabulary for these sorts of sound differences 
across languages; in effect, there are “gaps” in the system. But, unlike 
the color domain, where ad­hoc analogies are drawn, in the sound 
domain there are often conventionalized metaphors that speakers 
draw upon, suggesting perhaps natural analogies across different 
sensory domains. For example, in English, pitch differences are 
aligned to differences in vertical space as in the high–low opposition. 
A concomitant distinction can be made for amplitude differences: as 
well as everyday vocabulary, loud–quiet, amplitude differences can 
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natural analogy between high pitch and loud sounds (high amplitude), 
suggesting a universal non­linguistic crossmodal mapping between 
sound and space available to all. However, a different mapping is 
observed in Turkish, Farsi, and Zapotec speakers. Speakers of these 
languages refer to differences in pitch using a thick–thin opposition. 
The same terms are also used for loudness differences. But, when 
used for loudness the mapping is not parallel to that found in English. 
A thin sound is one that is high in pitch but low in amplitude (i.e. 
quiet) – the two dimensions of sound are inverted from the English 
point of view. The different available mappings are a caution against 
quick generalizations of “natural” or primary crossmodal mappings 
on the basis of English and other Indo­European languages – indeed 
retrospectively the Turkish–Farsi–Zapotec system may seem more 
“natural” than our own analogy, since small sound sources emit high 
pitches at low amplitude.
Exquisite Expressibility
Words by their very nature abstract over individual instances – the 
precise shade of red, or the smell of damask rose, is lost in the 
descriptions red or rose-scented. But in the articles by Dingemanse, 
Tufvesson, Brown, and Le Guen, the authors explore the special 
resources that some languages have developed for narrowing in on 
a precise referent, the flip side of inexpressibility.
Dingemanse and Tufvesson discuss ideophones, also known 
as expressives or mimetics. These are a special form class of 
words – neither nouns, verbs, nor adjectives. Ideophones stand out 
from other words in many ways: they have unusual phonotactics 
(combinations of sounds), special morphosyntactic features (usually 
displaying restricted combinatorial possibilities), and convey 
distinctive meaning in special ways. While English (and other Indo­
European languages) lack this class of words, similar word classes 
are found in diverse language families in most parts of the world, 
including South America, Africa, and Asia, suggesting they have 
been invented over and over again in different speech situations.
Their appearance around the world is most likely a result of their 
special ability to depict and invoke sensorial experiences. Ideophones 
are often iconic (their form resembles their meaning) and imagistic 
(conveying rich multimodal experiences). These characteristics lend 
to unparalleled expressibility of private experiences. Speakers are 
able to recount highly specific properties of experiences – the precise 
texture of an object felt, the specific shade of the color of an object, 
the exact sound in the air, and even the multimodal combination of 
properties, a bit like our sound­symbolic words ping, boing, wham, 
and so on.
Dingemanse explores how ideophones are both “precision tools” 
for zooming in on exact perception and “playthings” for enlivening 
discourse. Siwu speakers “illuminate” their discourse with frequent 
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one. In the words of one of Dingemanse’s teachers: “Without these 
words, speech is buà (bland). You need to pepper it.” But ideo­
phones do not merely function as “dramatic embellishments.” They 
are precise depictive devices too. Using a formal elicitation task 
Dingemanse is able to show high consistency amongst speakers’ 
choice of ideophones for conveying specific sensory experiences.
The specificity of expression made possible by ideophones 
is further elaborated by Tufvesson. She describes a remarkable 
analogic device in the ideophones or expressives of Semai where 
graded perceptual experience can be encoded by graded linguistic 
representation. In Semai ideophones, a basic template consisting 
of a consonant cluster expresses a general notion: of redness, 
acrid­smelling, or the fall of water. By changing the vowel within 
the consonant cluster, speakers can pinpoint a specific quale: the 
specific hue of red, the intensity level of the odor, or the size of the 
waterfall. The diagrammatic iconic structure that Tufvesson describes 
is a powerful resource for expressing private sensorial experiences.
Brown and Le Guen likewise consider specialized linguistic 
resources – in this case morphological devices – that allow 
speakers of two Mayan languages to express complex gestalts with 
multimodal characteristics. In both Tzeltal and Yucatec, speakers 
can succinctly package multifaceted perceptual experiences in 
compressed linguistic form. In Tzeltal, for example, a productive 
word­formation process allows speakers to take a basic color term, 
such as yax ‘grue (blue and green)’ and by applying a compounding 
and reduplication process produce a complex expression yax-boj-boj 
‘grue­cut­cut’ that specifies the particular shade of green, used by a 
speaker to describe the color of someone’s mouth after eating green 
vegetables. Likewise in Yucatec simple roots, such as k’ix ‘thorn,’ 
can participate in a number of different word formation templates 
to express nuances of perceptual experience: k’ik’ixkil ‘stinging’ 
(of three­day old stubble on a man), k’ixlemak ‘stinging (tactile 
experience)’ (of having a small piece of wood in the eye), k’ixik’ix 
‘thorns closely spatially distributed’ (of thorns on the bark of a tree 
close to one another) , k’ixunk’íix ‘thorns sparsely spatially distributed’ 
(of widely spaced thorns on the bark of a tree), etc. Compounds like 
these elegantly package crossmodal sensations expressing a whole 
gestalt with economic precision. Yucatec speakers convey the visual 
or tactile nature of the experience, the precise spatial distribution of 
a pattern; Tzeltal speakers pithily combine concepts of color and 
taste with notions of reflectance, intensity, vitality, shape, texture, and 
consistency. This affordance of the language allows speakers certain 
advantages. Tzeltal speakers, for example, are able to express the 
non­focal nature of the perceptual experience that otherwise is lost if 
the basic term alone is applied.
In everyday discourse, Yucatec and Tzeltal speakers draw on the 
productive resources of their languages. Unlike the frequent use of 
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finds that sensory vocabulary is rare in Yucatec discourse. Where it 
is found, Le Guen argues it has little to do with the material culture 
of the speakers but rather is used to lend liveliness to dialogue. In 
contrast, Brown finds that the Tzeltal morphological expressivity 
can be linked to cultural practices and environmental contingencies. 
By examining the situations in which speakers call on color words 
(for example, when making distinctions in natural kinds, patterns of 
chicken coloring, leaf coloring, etc.) and exploring the role of tastes in 
indigenous medicine, Brown illustrates the connectedness between 
cultural practice, individual percept, and community language.
Final Words
We hope these articles will collectively go some way to rehabilitate 
the contribution of linguistic analysis to the study of the senses in 
culture and society. Language is an extraordinary system of public 
representations for private sensations, but with its digital form and 
relatively coarse finite vocabularies, it is never able to capture all 
the rich, particularistic essence or qualia of sensory experience. 
Nevertheless, the differential elaboration of sensory fields across 
languages offers a wonderful acoustic map of each culture’s rich 
sensorial landscapes. Viewing these different sense­scapes around 
the world we can detect domains where one culture sings and 
another is silent. Where we find domains in which the voice is always 
hushed, we may suspect that we are approaching the intrinsic 
limitations of language, where perhaps the structure of the mind 
strangles conscious access to those aspects of experience. This too 
may be what the cultural aesthetics of the senses plays on, invoking 
the liminal presence of felt experience.
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4. This emphasis on reflectance and a consequent downplaying 
of hue is equally found in Homeric Greek, as Gladstone (1858: 
397–499) pointed out, prompting the cross­linguistic study of 
color terminology 150 years ago.
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